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NEW PROTEST ELITES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF WEST-BERLIN:
THE ECLIPSE OF CONSENSUS ?
Introduction
It is one of the established assumptions in modern elite theory that a 
mixture of both consent and dissent between strategic elites is one of the 
basic prerequisites to the stability of political regimes and to the 
efficiency of policy-making. In this theoretical context, consent refers 
to procedural norms and institutional structures of the polity, whereas 
dissent refers to divisions on substantive matters of political decision­
making. To be sure, in empirical research it may not be easy to define 
clearly which norms or substantive issues are to be investigated, and some­
times even the differentiation between norms and issues may cause conceptua. 
hazards, - particularly if controversial definitions of the political 
actors themselves come into play. Also, a particular issue may grow so 
salient for an elite that the controversy about it becomes fierce, thus 
disturbing the consent about the "rules of the game".
Yet, as a general working device the consent-cum-dissent assumption has 
proved to be a powerful stimulus for theoretical and empirical studies on 
the functions of elites in many countries such as Norway (Highley 1976), 
the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968), Canada (Presthus, 1974), Austria (Stief- 
bold, 1974), England (Putnam, 1973), the USA (McCl^ky, 1960) and others.
In the case of Germany, a variety of writers have used the consent-cum- 
dissent hypothesis in order to assess the viability and performance of a 
liberal democratic system, with reference to the Weimar Republic and to 
the Federal Republic. Authors in the sixties, like Ralf Dahrendorf (1968), 
have emphasized a peculiar lack of inter-elite conflict which - in com­
bination with a considerable degree of mutual distrust between the leading 




























































































cause not only for a general conservatism and decisional stalemate during
ihat
the mid-sixties but also as a factor/may jeopardize the stability of the 
system.
This picture contrasts sharply with results of elite studies in the 
seventies. As Rudolf Wildenmann and his associates (Wildenmann, 1971, 1975; 
Hoffmann-Lange, 1980) could demonstrate on the evidence of successive elite 
surveys, a broad consensus about fundamental norms of the system exist among 
political (and also societal) elites in the Federal Republic, while on the 
other hand there is a considerable amount of inter-elite conflict about 
major issues, - a mixture which allows a dynamic political process whit' i 
a stable, i.e. generally accepted institutional context. Elites are thus 
being able to form variable coalitions and to communicate cooperatively.
While these results may - grosso modo - still hold true in the eighties, 
we observe recently certain new developments within the political elite 
formation which causes questions about the prospects for efficient inter- 
elite cooperation.
Firstly, a new generation with other values and priorities enters into the 
political arena and gradually also into the political leadership stratum. 
(Inglehart, 1981) Secondly, members of the steadily growing class of 
professional academics (which Gouldner has called "Bildungsklasse") with 
new interests and behaviour oatterns are increasingly intruding party 
and parliamentary elites. (Feist/Liepelt, 1982; Herzog, 1982) Both 
developments seem to change the structure of political decision-making.
Among the political parties particulary the Social Democratic Party is 
gradually being transformed from a "stratarchic" Volkspartei into a type 





























































































Thirdly, a variety of new social movements - ecological, peace, women 
emancipation and others, are increasingly putting pressure on the politi­
cal process. They also constitute an apparently stable, although still 
diffuse, electoral basic for new political parties; under different 
labels like "Grune" or "Alternative Listen", they already succeeded in en­
tering several local councils and Lander parliaments (Baden-Württemberg, 
Hesse, Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Lower-Saxonia). On the evidence of recent 
opinion polls, it may be expected that a party of that kind will gather up 
to 9 ?o of the vote in general elections and will thus be represented in 
the next Bundestag. At the moment, these new parties not only advocate 
particular issues, most of them of a protest or anti-form (anti-nuclear 
energy, anti-economic growth, anti-military defence etc), but they also 
call into question the conventional party and parliamentary decision­
making procedures. Outside parliament, a kind of rousseauist direct- 
democracy is being practized, whereas within parliament heavy pressure is 
exerted on governments while deliberately abstaining from taking over 
governmental responsibilities. As one of their activists has put ist, 
they are living on two feet, one outside parliament for "standing", the 
other inside parliament for "playing".
These new developments in the German party system cause a number of 
questions for empirical elite research:
- How many and of which kind are the areas of inter-elite consent resp. 
dissent?
- How do major cleavages run, - between the established parties on the one 




























































































- Are the areas of dissent of such kind that inter-elite cooperation and 
coalition-building is severely hampered, with the possible effect of 
blocking political decision-making or even destabilizing the political
system?
- What are the social bases of new intra- and inter-elite cleavages, i.e. 
how durable will they be in the future?
Whereas the last question cannot be answered at the moment, because the rele 
vant data have not been analyzed so far, this paper will try to give an 
answer to the first three, - however tentatively. The data stem from a 
research project, directed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and myself. Its subject 
is the crisis in the sociopolitical system of West-Berlin, concentrating 
on several, yet integrated, research dimensions like voting behaviour, parti 
cipation, attitudes and values, mass-elite linkages and inter-elite conflict 
The data bases are, among others, an aggregate analysis of voting behaviour 
in West-Berlin since 1946, an elite network analysis, a representative 
population survey and a mail survey among all candidates for the Berlin 
parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus) and the 12 district assemblies (Bezirksver- 
ordnetenversammlung), the two surveys having been conducted shortly before 
the last Berlin elections on May 10, 1981.
Among the 1911 candidates, 45.8 percent returned the questionnaire, which 
is a comparatively good response ratio, although it should be added, that 
the very top politicians have participated less frequently and the response 
rates from the parties differing a lot. The communist SEW (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei West-Berlin) has rejected any cooperation. (Table 1)
In the candidate questionaire a number of questions about social status, 
attitudes and values have been taken in, which were also used in the 




























































































questions have been introduced which were used in the recent national 
elite survey, conducted by Rudolf Wildenmann, Max Kaase andtheir 
associates; so a comparative analysis between Berlin and the Federal 
Republic will be possible.
In this paper, only some of the results will be presented. (Extract from 
the questionnaire see Appendix A) It is a preliminary analysis, based on a 
prima facie inspection of some data. Teetotal research project will - hope­
fully - be finished mid-1983.
Certainly, the situation in Berlin cannot be equated with that in the 
Federal Republic in general. On the other hand, social and political de­
velopments in the metropolitan centres may be considered as being typical or 
at least indicative for major changes in the national context. In addition, 
Berlin is particularly interesting because here changes of the party system 
are apparent and the new social movements are specifically virulent. On 
their basis, the new political group "Alternative liste" (AL) succeded in 
gathering 7.2 percent of the vote in the last elections, thus being now 
representend in the Berlin parliament. (Table 2) This election has also 
made a notable impact on the political regime in so far as the long-standing 
coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP), that formed the 
government since 1963 (with the interruption of a one-party SPD government 
from 1971 to 1975) lost its majority, giving way for the first time to a 





























































































Starting with an analysis of attitudes towards basic principles of the 
political order, we find a general consensus between the leadership strata, 
of all Berlin parties. The principle of "alternating government" is common­
ly approved. (Table 3) Even within those parties which have been in power 
since several legislative periods in Berlin and also in the Federal Republic 
(SPD and FDP), a clear majority agrees with the necessity of changing govern­
mental responsibilities from time to time.
Remarkably here, as in others of the following tables, we find a rather 
large section of around one fourth to one third of the candidates from the 
"established" parties, who are in a middle position, i.e. neither fully 
agreeing nor fully disagreeing. This may cause some theoretical reflections. 
Leaving aside the possibility that these people are actually undecided 
about the matter (an interpretation which does not seem to be very 
sensible with respect to political activists standing for election), two 
different interpretations might be offered: Firstly, that there are more 
party leaders, particularly within the SPD, who are at least sceptical 
about the democratic principle of "alternating government" than it would 
appear under a strict dichotomy between the "yeas" and the "noes". Seco, .y 
under a different theoretical perspective, one may propose that the middle 
position on an attitude scale, like that under scrutiny, is a specific one; 
these people may hold a mixture of governmental stability (e.g. for long­
term planning) and the existence of a strong opposition (that is able to 
control government effectively and to take over governmental responsibilities) 
is desirable. With this last mentioned interpretation - which has a long 
philosophical tradition since Aristotle -, we can understand the groups in 
the middle position, that are comparatively big in all established parties, 
as indicative for a well-reflected and consensual option in favour of a 




























































































In the same way, attitudes towards public control of government may be 
interpreted. (Table 4) Clearly, the CDU elite is more authoritatively 
oriented than those of the other parties. Yet, underst ding the interview 
question strictly as it is formulated, one can argue that the existence of 
a strong, i.e. effectively working, government is not incompatible with 
efficient public control of governmental actions, but that in stable demo­
cratic polities both are functionally interdependent. Thus, elites of the 
two major parties are conspicuously consensual in this regard.
With respect to both items, the AL candidates differ a lot. Nearly un­
animously they emphasise the necessity of changing government and of the 
superiority of public control vs. strong government. This reflects their 
more radical stand towards democratic principles as well as their present 
situation as a kind of "out-group" in the established power hierarchy.
A similar picture emerges when we look at attitudes towards principles of 
pluralism. All party elites are overwhelmingly against a political system 
in which government overrides group interests, - although it should be 
noted that in this respect the Christian Democratic (CDU and CSU) leader­
ship in the Federal Republic is distinctively more authoritarian than other 
parties and also than their Berlin branch. (Table 4a)
By contrast, there is less consent befceen the Christian Democrats and all 
other parties with respect to the question, whether the "general good" 
might be decreased by the pressure of interest groups. (Table 5) A majority 
of CDU leaders are supporting this statement. But again, a rather big 
group in the middle position of this attitudinal dimension (42. percent 
in Berlin, and nearly 50 percent at the Federal level), is indicative for 
the fact that there is no strict opposition against the principle of 
interest pluralism, although many are sceptical about the possible effects 





























































































More diffuse are attitudes of the Berlin leadership strata towards prin­
ciples of Liberalism. Some issues suggest a very strong inter-elite consent. 
This refers, for instance, to the issues of "death penalty", which is 
clearly opposed by all (66 percent in the CDU, and more than 90 percent 
in the other parties). Any pressure for re-introducing the death penalty 
into West-German criminal law would have no chance of realization by political 
leaders. (Table 6)
Consent also exists between all parties about the legitimacy of "comprorr a" 
in political decision-making. More than 80 percent among candidates of 
the established parties, and even a majority of 53 percent among the AL 
activists, are in favor of politics by compromise.
Noteworthy, a further consent area is found with respect to participation 
in industry. A majority of all party elites accept the proposition that the 
chance for individual participation in the regulation of their jobs (Mit- 
bestimmung am Arbeitsplatz) is one of the prerequisites of political demo­
cracy, - with a rather strong, at the Federal level even majoritarian, 
sceptical middle group in the CDU. (Table 7)
But on other items of Liberalism, inter elite consensus is rather fragile. 
Here the divisions are mostly between the Christian Democrats and all other 
parties. One of these items is "freedom of opinion and discussion". To be
sure, we have to consider the fact, that the interview question ist not
\"limits" to the freedan of opinion may be understood either individually/ 
formulated unequivocaliyyCin the sense that people are not willing to
discuss or modify their personal basic moral conviction) or collectively




























































































Holding this epistomological vagueness in mind, we can cautiously deduce 
from the data that only among the Christian Democrats there is a substan­
tial group who have a rather restrictive understanding of that liberal 
principle, while SPD, FDP and AL candidates - in this rank order - are 
supporting an unlimited freedom of opinion and discussion. (Table 8)
More rigidly drawn are the attitudinal divisions on items of specific 
forms through wihich public opinion may by voiced. Asked how strongly they 
feel about "more say of citizens in political decisions", only about 
15 percent of the Christian Democrats, and 19 percent of the Social 
Democrats, are answering "very important". In contrast, nearly half of the 
Liberals and all of the "Alternatives" are strongly in favor of more 
plebiscitarian democracy. (Table 9) Only if we combine those who answer 
"very important" and "important", a clear majority emerges in all parties 
supporting the strengthening of citizens’ participation in politics. While 
this principle is generally accepted, the emphasis laid on its promotion 
varies a lot between the parties, seperating particularly the Christian 
Democrats on the conservative side.
Similarly, attitudes differ with respect to specific legislative actions. 
Among all interviewees, only within the ranks of the Christian Democrats 
we find a substantial number of candidates who are strongly in favor of 
restricting the right of political demonstrations. (Table 10) Vet, from 
a different perspective, even if we add those who just answer "important", 
there is no majority (but only 37 percent) in the total CDU elite stratum 
opting for more restrictive measures. This finding may ring a bell in the 





























































































More pronounced are Christian Democrats when the issue of the police force 
is at stake. One quarter strongly favors the threngthening of the police, 
and a clear majority of about 66 percent (answering "very important" or 
"important") would back governmental actions for that purpose. It is in 
this field where the Christian Democrats may be understood as the party 
of "law and order", - they are very consensual inside and very much 
separated from the other parties. (Table 11)
Looking at attitude towards "citizen action groups" (Burgerinitiativen), 
a different cleavage comes to the fore. Here only the "Alternatives" are 
(nearly unanimously) approving more influence by these groups, while th. 
established parties are strongly against it. However, this must not mean 
a general opposition to action groups; since the interview question com­
bines "more influence by action groups" with a reciprocal "less influence 
by political parties", there is no reason to assume that leaders of 
established parties voluntarily renounce their power (and responsibili­
ties to their voters) to particular societal interests, - however positively 
or negatively they may be evaluated as forms of participation in general. 
(Table 12)
A third type of inter-elite division is exemplified by attitudes concerning 
the influence of trade unions. Understandably, we find here the "bourgeois" 
parties (CDU and FDP) on the negative side, while Social Democrats and 
also AL are fostering more influence by organized labour. Yet, both are 
by no means unanimous. Even within the over hundred years old "workers 
party", there is a substantial group of leading activists (about one 
third) who are at least sceptical about the power of trade unions, - a 




























































































Environment, Economy, and Foreign Relations
While we have been finding certain distinct inter-elite cleavages 
concerning matters of Liberalism and participation, although with different 
patters of crisscrossing latent coalitions, there is another picture if 
we look at areas of economic, environmental and foreign politics.
Being asked whether the system of social welfare (Sozialstaat) should be 
enhanced, remain as it is now, or be reduced, only the "Alternatives" 
are strongly in favor of strengthening the "welfare net", whereas even 
within the Social Democratic leadership cadres no more than about 41 per­
cent would argue in this direction. (Table 14) There is a sufficient 
basis of consent, however, in all three established parties agreeing to 
preserve the present state of the "welfare system". (It may be added that 
this attitudinal pattern may be very different among party elite at the 
Federal level, although at the moment there are no comparable data at 
hand.)
Whether the "protection of the environment" is a consensual issue or not 
may be a matter of argument. As table 15 shows, only a small majority 
among the Liberals and the Social Democrats, and of course nearly all 
"Alternatives", are very strongly environmentally motivated. But summing up 
those who feel that environmental politics is either "very important" or 
at least "improtant", we find a clear majority of 90 percent and more in 
all parties. Thus, the importance of environmental considerations in 
politics seems to be generally accepted by all politicans, - the diffe­
rences between them being more a matter of degree than of kind.
Conversely, the Berlin political class is rather sharply divided between 




























































































at certain crucial problems of economic and foreign politics. (Tables 16,17) 
Asked about their stand towards "economic growth" and "nuclear energy", 
we find a positive majority only in the CDU, with all other party elites 
being sceptical or adversary. Vet the "hard core" of strong opponents is 
much smaller in the SPD and FDP than among the "Alternative" candidates.
On both issues, therefore, the main division is clearly separating the £ 
Christian Democrats from all other parties, but there seems to exist a 
second, minor cleavage between the two established parties (SPD, FDP) and 
the "Alternatives", who hold a particularly strong position in both 
policy areas.
Additionally, because of the present salience of the nuclear issue, 
a brief look at the opinions of the electorate may be of interest. As table 
18 shows, the voters of the Christian Democrats are conspicuously more 
reluctant in supporting nuclear energy than their party. Conversely, 
there are more proponents of nuclear energy among the Social-Democratic 
and also "Alternative" voters than among their parties* leaders. Thus,
dissent on this issue is more accentuated by the elites than it is in the
I
electorates.
On foreign policy issues, the Anti-Communist consens, which was characte­
ristic for Berlin in the fifties and sixties, seems to be broken up, - 
at least at the political elite level. Looking at the attitudes towards 
"World Communism" (Table 19), we find only the Christian Democratic can­
didates understanding "World Communism" as the most important threat to 
Western democracies, and their leadership stratum is nearly unanimous on 
this issue. Among all items analyzed so far, "Anti-Communism" ist that issue 





























































































also roughly the same in West-Berlin and at the Federal level.
All other parties are on an adversary stand, with the Social Democrats and 
the Liberals internally rather divided and the "Alternatives" very un­
animous and on the extreme position.
This corresponds to attitudes towards foreign policy strategies. Only a 
majority of CDU candidates advocate a "policy of military strength", 
i.e. a "strong NATO", while this is strongly opposed by all other parties. 
(Table 20)
It should bejbdded, however, that under the premise of an East-West arms 
reduction, more than 80 percent of CDU, SPD, and FDP candidates are pro- 
NATO, while only about a quarter of the Social Democrats and of the Liberals 
are favoring the dissolution of NATO (and the Warshaw Treaty Organization). 
So we find two cleavages in the total political elite stratum in Berlin: One 
that separates sharply the CDU from all other parties, refering to a "policy 
of military strength"; the other dividing the established parties from the 
AL, with respect to the preservation/dissolution of the Western military 
alliance.
Again, an elite-mass comparison reveals distinctively different patterns. 
Whereas on the Christian Democratic side, candidates and their voters have 
roughly similar preferences, notable incongruencies are apparent on the side 
of the other parties; in contrast to their candidates, about one third of
A
the SPD and of the FDP voters are supporting a "strong NATO", while con­
versely there are less AL voters favoring a dissolution of the Western and 
Eastern military alliances than AL candidates. In this crucial area, politic 





























































































Inter-Elite Consent and Dissent Areas; A Summary
Summarizing the foregoing analysis, the following table gives a rough 
overview about inter-elite consent and dissent.
AREAS OF INTER-ELITE CONSENT AND DISSENT
(1) Inter-elite consent
Alternating government 
Public control of government 
Legitimacy of interest groups 
Compromise in politics
Individual participation at thetark place (as a prerequisite 
for democracy)
Death penalty
Protection of the environment
(2) Dissent between established parties (CPU, SPD, FDP) vs. AL
More influence by action groups, less by political parties 
Welfare state
Dissolution of NATO (and Warshaw Treaty Organization) ^
(3) Dissent between "bourgeois" parties (CPU, FDP) vs. "left-wing" 
parties (SPD, AL)
More influence by labour unions
(4) Dissent between CPU vs. all others (SPD, FDP, AL)
Interests as threat to "common good"
Limits to freedom of opinion
More say for people in political decisions
Limits to the right for demonstrations
Strengthening of policy force
Politics of economic growth
Nuclear energy
Anti-Communism
Politics of military strength ^




























































































By inspecting the issues, three things emerge: Firstly, there is a wide 
spread consensus between all Berlin parties about fundamentals of govern­
ment. This includes also the acceptance of compromise in political decision­
making, the opposition against re-introducing the death penalty, the value 
of ecological considerations, and a participatory non-authoritative employer- 
employee relationship. On the other hand, there are many inter-elite conflict 
areas not only on substantive - and indeed salient - issues but also on 
matters of Liberalism and political participation.
Secondly, the traditional antagonism between the "bourgeois" parties and the 
"Socialists" does not seem to constitute a major cleavage any longer. Nor 
do we find most conflicts as separating the established parties from the 
emerging new party of the "Alternative movement", - although the differences 
between them may be rather distinct in some issue areas. Instead, the 
dividing line of dissent on a variety of issues concerning substantive policy 
matters and procedural norms of Liberalism runs between the Christian 
Democrats on the one hand and the three other parties (SPD, FDP, AL) on 
the other. These conflict areas would need thorough sociological analysis.
Thirdly, from the inspection of the data so far presented here, it does not 
appear that the eclipse of inter-elite consensus in Berlin may destabilize 
the political system. Fundamental norms for democratic government are shared 
by all party elites. Yet, there are certain salient policy issues, like 
economic growth, nuclear energy, and international politics (e.g. military 
strength, NATO), where inter-elite dissent has obviously deepened in recent 
years. This may put severe strains on the political process. Inter-elite 
cooperation and coalition building in parliament may bee severely hampered.




























































































majority in parliament) and the new party of the "Alternatives" (with 
around 7 percent of the vote) are both internally quite consensual and 
externally extremely far apart, - with the Social Democrats and the 
Liberals drifting away from the former consensus of the established 
parties. Thus, in spatial terms, the middle position in the total political 
spectrum has become weakened, with the chances of stable majority formation 




































































































Total 1911 875 45.8
CDU 653 262 40.1
SPD 652 384 58.9
FDP 210 120 58.0
AL 199 86 43.2
others 197 22 12.0
Abgeordneten-
haus 718 314 43.7
Bezirksver-
ordnetenver-
sammlung 1193 561 47.0
Table 2: Election Results for Berlin Parliament (Abqeordnetenhaus)
1979 1981
(3.March) (10.May)
Voting Turnout (?ó) 85.4 85.3
Voters (°ó)
CDU 44.4 47.9







































































































Table 3 : Stability of government more important than chance for
changing governmental majorities (?o)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Agree 18 27 23 1
Middle 29 35 26 14
Disagree 53 38 51 85
Positive all 
(agreeing)
33 45 37 6
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
67 55 63 94
N 256 378 117 81
X -.96 -.30 -.71 - 2.4
StD 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.1
Table 4 : Strong government more important than public control
of government (?o)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Agree 33 18 14 2
Middle 35 37 23 1
Disagree 32 45 63 97
Positive all 
(agreeing)
57 39 24 2
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
43 61 76 98
N 253 378 116 84
X .18 -.69 - 1.13 -2.73
StD 2.2 2.1 2.0 1 . 0






































































































Agree 23 35 7 11 5 16
Middle 27 33 14 34 13 32 1
Disagree 50 32 79 55 82 52 99
Positive all 
(agreeing)
39 55 15 28 11 24 1
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
61 45 85 72 89 76 99
N 256 121 380 122 118 25 83
X -.71 .03 -2.1 - 1 . 0 -2.3 -.86 -2.9
StD 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 .46
Table 5 : Demands by interest groups decrease "general good" (
CDU SPD FDP AL
Agree 30 14 12 2
Middle 42 25 32 5
Disagree 28 61 56 93
Positive all 
(agreeing)
60 27 25 2
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
40 73 75 98
N 256 380 119 82
X
lACsl -1.3 -1.3 -2.7




























































































Table 6 : Re-■introduction of death penalty (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Agree 19 6 4 -
Middle 24 7 8 1
Disagree 57 87 88 99
Positive all 
(agreeing)
34 11 8 -
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
66 89 92 100
N 256 382 119 84
X -1.1 -2.4 -2.5 -3.0
StD 2.3 1.5 1.4 0.2









Agree 2 21 83 91 70 48 93
Middle 49 64 16 7 26 36 7
Disagree 19 15 1 2 4 16 -
Positive all 
(agreeing)
66 61 96 97 87 76 99
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
34 39 4 3 13 24 1
N 256 122 381 123 118 25 84
X .57 .15 2.4 2.0 1.7 .66 2.7




























































































Table 8 : Limits to freedom of opinion (*)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Agree 53 24 20 4
Middle 28 26 21 18
Disagree 19 50 59 78
Positive all 
(agreeing)
74 44 29 12
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
26 56 71 68
N 255 376 118 83
X 1 . 0 -.79 -1.1 -2.1
StD 2.1 2.2 2.3 1.4
Table 9 : More say of citizens in political decisions (?e)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Very important 
Important 15> “  49 '
29 \ 80
51 4> 34 6 ^
94-^
Not so important 30 16 6 —
Unimportant 2 2 - 1
Against 4 2 1 -




























































































Table 10 : Restriction for right of demonstration (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL




Not so important 27 10 11 -
Unimportant 8 8 8 -
Against 27 75 79 100
N 246 369 114 82





Important 4 1 / 66 ! 7 / 23 9/ 15 -
Not so important 26 38 30 2
Unimportant 3 10 13 5
Against 5 29 42 93




























































































Table 12 : More influence by action groups (?ò)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Very important 0 1 4 55
Important 4 9 14 36
Not so important 22 31 34 8
Unimportant 13 10 11 1
Against 61 49 37 -
N 248 363 111 84
Table 13 : More influence by labour unions (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Very important 1-^ 12^_ 1 . 19\
Important 4 /  * /  59 47x 3/ 4 3 6 > 55
Not so important 27 32 34 35
Unimportant 10 1 11 5
Against 58 8 51 5
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Table 14: Social welfare system (»)
CDU SPD FDP AL (
Strengthening 7 41 17 75
Keeping as it is 57 53 6Ü 21
More individual 
self-care 36 6 23 4
N 259 379 120 79
Table 15: Environmental considerations necessary (?o)









9 1 \> 1 0 0
9 ^
Not so important 10 6 3 -
Unimportant - 0 - -
Against 1 — 1 -




























































































Table 16 : Economie growth (%)





















18> 7*5 6 ^
N 242 370 115 80
Table 17 : Nuclear energy (attitudes of candidates) (?o)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Very important 47 12 12 -
Important 44 29 27 14
Not so important 7 22 26 14





Against 2 3 1 ^ 3 2 ^ 72




























































































Table 18 : Nuclear enerqy (attitudes of voters) (?o)
V o t e r s o f :
CDU SPD FDP AL
Very important 29 16 13 3
Important 48 37 32 11
Not so important 15 31 29 23
Unimportant 2 6 10 17
Against 6 10 16 46
N 348 261 49 81
Table 19: World Communism as threat to Western democracies (?i)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Agree 81 22 21 __
Middle 15 34 33 5
Disagree 4 44 46 95
Positive all 
(agreeing)
93 38 40 1
Negative all 
(disagreeing)
7 62 60 99
N 256 381 119 82
X 2.2 -.64 -.62 -2.7
StD 1.3 2.2 2.2 .7





























































































Table 20: Attitudes toward NATO (candidates) (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Strong NATO 58 6 6 -
Arms reduction 
(by NATO and 
Warshaw Treaty 
Org.)
38 67 71 2
Dissolution of 
NATO and Warshaw 
Treaty Org.
4 27 23 98
N 258 380 119 86
Table 21: Attitudes toward NATO (voters) (?ó)
V o t e r s o f
CDU SPD FDP AL
Strong NATO 60 33 34 5
Arms reduction 27 42 42 23
Dissolution of 
NATO and Warshaw 
Treaty Org.
11 23 24 71
Don’t know 2 2 0 1
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Stabilitat und Kontinuitat der politischen Führung 
Stability of government more 
important
sind fur die Bundesrepublik wichtiger als eine mog- 
than chance for changing governmental 
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